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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2481 
____________ 
 
CHETTY HOLDINGS INC; CARL E. CHETTY,  
T/A Millville Apartment Homes, LP, 
                                                                                  Appellants 
 
v. 
 
NORTHMARQ CAPITAL, LLC; TIMOTHY C. KUHN  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-04640) 
District Judge: Thomas N. O'Neill, Junior 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and STARK,
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: February 10, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
*
The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants Chetty Holdings, Inc. and Carl E. Chetty (collectively, “Chetty”) 
appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their third amended complaint.  Chetty alleged 
that Appellees NorthMarq Capital, LLC (“NorthMarq”) and its employee Timothy C. 
Kuhn (collectively, “Appellees”) were negligent and made certain negligent 
misrepresentations that prevented Chetty from obtaining a mortgage refinancing loan 
insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).  
Because the District Court properly concluded that Chetty failed to establish proximate 
cause, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Chetty financed the purchase of the Millview Apartment Homes (the “Millview 
Property”) through a fifteen-year forward mortgage for approximately $27 million with 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern Mutual”).  The mortgage 
contained a provision that imposed a prepayment penalty in the event Chetty sought to 
pay off the mortgage in full.  In response to the financial crisis and a downturn in 
occupancy, Northwestern Mutual offered to waive the prepayment penalties to allow 
Chetty to refinance the loan on the Millview Property in early 2009.   
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 Shortly thereafter, Kuhn (on behalf of NorthMarq) initiated discussions with 
Chetty about securing a loan for the refinancing.  Kuhn reviewed the financial status of 
the Millview Property and Chetty Holdings and recommended that Chetty apply for a 
refinancing loan through NorthMarq’s underwriting arm, AmeriSphere Mortgage 
Finance, LLC (“AmeriSphere”).1  Chetty alleges that Kuhn was the “point person for 
Plaintiffs throughout the [application] process,” and that Kuhn made negligent 
misrepresentations about the application process and the anticipated outcome.  App. at 
349.  Kuhn presented Chetty with a proposed engagement letter on July 7, 2009 that 
purported to set forth an agreement between Chetty and AmeriSphere, in which 
AmeriSphere would “provide Mortgage Insurance processing services . . . for a mortgage 
loan.”  App. at 231.  Pursuant to the engagement letter, Chetty provided a substantial 
amount of information and documentation to AmeriSphere about the Millview Property.   
 Before Northwestern Mutual would issue a written modification of the terms of 
the mortgage (by waiving the prepayment penalty), it requested a timeline for completion 
of the refinance application process.  Kuhn provided the timeline, which specified 
“approximate” start and end dates for each phase, and specified that the dates were 
“anticipated subsequent milestones related to the . . . refinance.”  App. at 75 (emphasis 
added).  The timeline provided that the loan was anticipated to close by July 31, 2010.  
                                              
1
 The third amended complaint indicates that Chetty was to apply for a “223(f) 
FHA/HUD loan.”  App. at 348.  As noted by Appellees, AmeriSphere agreed to provide 
the loan, provided that Chetty secured mortgage insurance from HUD.  Appellees’ Br. at 
22 n.10.  AmeriSphere is no longer a party to this case.   
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Northwestern Mutual thereafter issued a written loan modification agreement that waived 
the prepayment penalty until July 31, 2010.  Kuhn allegedly represented to Chetty that 
Northwestern Mutual would be lenient with imposing the prepayment penalty, even after 
the July 31, 2010 date.   
Kuhn “strenuously objected” to Chetty’s attempts to list the Millview Property for 
sale, and Chetty turned down one offer to purchase the property.  App. at 353.  Chetty 
therefore alleges that Appellees negligently failed to recommend that Chetty pursue the 
sale of the Millview Property while applying for the refinance loan to ensure that either 
the loan would close or the property would sell before the waiver period ended. 
 In April 2010, AmeriSphere completed Chetty’s application.  AmeriSphere’s 
internal loan processing committee assessed and approved the application, concluding 
that it met all essential criteria for HUD’s firm commitment to insure the loan.  Chetty 
wired a $95,040 application fee to AmeriSphere, which was sent, along with the 
application, to HUD.  HUD denied Chetty’s application on July 30, 2010 due to Chetty’s 
failure to make timely payments on its existing mortgage and the Millview Property’s 
inconsistent occupancy.  Chetty alleges it then “had no choice but to pursue a sale of the 
Millview Property” after the July 31, 2010 deadline.  App. at 358.  As a result of that 
sale, Chetty incurred $2.6 million in prepayment penalties, in addition to the $95,040 
application fee, a $5,000 processing fee paid to NorthMarq, and $22,000 in consultant 
fees, also paid to NorthMarq. 
  
5 
 Chetty filed suit in the District Court and filed a third amended complaint on May 
25, 2012, asserting claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation.  By 
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 22, 2013, the District Court dismissed the 
third amended complaint on the ground that Chetty failed to adequately plead the 
necessary element of proximate cause.  This appeal timely followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over 
the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing AT&T v. JMC 
Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2006)).  When analyzing a motion to dismiss 
we, like the district court, “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as 
true . . . [and] must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are 
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678-79 (2009)).  Conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to 
survive the plausibility standard.  Id. at 210.   
III. 
 The parties dispute the extent to which proximate cause may be determined by the 
court.  Chetty maintains that proximate cause is an inherently fact-based question that 
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should generally be resolved by a jury.  See Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. 
1977) (explaining that the issue of proximate cause “should not be taken from the jury if 
the jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant was a 
substantial cause or an insignificant cause” (emphasis added)).  Appellees counter that 
proximate cause is a question of law properly decided by the court.  See Vattimo v. Lower 
Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1983) (recognizing that proximate cause is 
an issue of legal policy); Eckroth v. Pa. Elec., Inc., 12 A.3d 422, 427-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010) (stating that proximate cause is an issue of law for the court to determine).  As 
Ford makes clear, however, nothing precludes a court from determining proximate cause 
as a matter of law if a jury could not reasonably differ on the issue.  379 A.2d at 114.  
Because a jury could not reasonably conclude that Appellees’ alleged actions proximately 
caused Chetty’s injury, the District Court did not err in dismissing the case.  
A party suing for negligence must prove, inter alia, causation between the alleged 
wrongful act and the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.2  Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088, 
1103 (Pa. 2012) (Todd, J., dissenting).  Proximate or legal causation is “that point at 
which legal responsibility should attach to the defendant as a matter of fairness because 
the plaintiff has demonstrated . . . that the defendant’s act was a ‘substantial factor’ or a 
‘substantial cause,’ as opposed to an ‘insignificant cause’ or a ‘negligible cause,’ in 
                                              
2
 Causation is a necessary element in both negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation claims.  See Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (negligent misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law); Toogood v. Owen J. 
Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (negligence). 
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bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”  Id. (quoting Ford, 379 A.2d at 114).  Pennsylvania 
courts have adopted the “substantial factor” theory of proximate cause from Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 431 (1965).  Ford, 379 A.2d at 114.  Under § 431, an “actor’s 
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if [] his conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm . . . .”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431. 
Pennsylvania has also adopted the Restatement’s definition of “substantial factor.”  
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965); Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 
56 n.36 (Pa. 2012) (acknowledging that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has cited 
Section 433 as consistent with Pennsylvania law” (citing Vattimo, 465 A.2d at 1233-34)).  
Section 433 provides: 
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one 
another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another: 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and 
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; 
(b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which 
are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has 
created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the 
actor is not responsible; 
(c) lapse of time. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433.  The District Court properly took these 
considerations into account in finding that no jury could reasonably conclude that 
Appellees’ negligence—if proved—was a substantial factor in causing Chetty’s alleged 
injury. 
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 The District Court identified a number of “other factors” that contributed 
substantially to Chetty’s injury.  Chief among them were Chetty’s agreement to a 
mortgage that included substantial prepayment penalties and Chetty’s decision to sell the 
Millview Property.  Appellees had no involvement in those decisions, and it was Chetty’s 
decision to sell the Millview Property—not any negligence on Appellees’ part—that 
ultimately led Chetty to incur the $2.6 million in penalties due to Northwestern Mutual.   
 Appellees likewise had no control over HUD’s decision to reject the application 
for mortgage insurance.  Instead, the rejection was the result of several additional factors 
identified by the District Court, including:  (1) the drop in occupancy at the Millview 
Property; (2) Chetty’s failure to make timely payments on the mortgage; and (3) HUD’s 
conclusion that Chetty did not qualify for a loan and its refusal to provide insurance.  
Although Chetty maintains that Appellees’ negligence caused HUD’s rejection (and the 
resulting fees), that argument misses the mark.  The complaint indicates that it was 
AmeriSphere, not NorthMarq or Kuhn, whose “internal loan processing committee had 
approved Plaintiffs’ application and determined that Plaintiffs’ application met all of the 
essential criteria for the issuance of a HUD Firm Commitment.”  App. at 355.  Taken 
together, these external factors were the substantial factor that brought about Chetty’s 
alleged harm. 
Other pleaded facts demonstrate how Appellees’ conduct merely “created a 
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which [they are] not 
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responsible.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(b).  Assuming Appellees were 
negligent (as we must) does not change the substantial impact of: (1) the economic 
hardships on the Millview Property; (2) HUD’s decision to reject the loan insurance 
application; and (3) Northwestern Mutual’s decision not to extend the penalty waiver.  
These facts independently operated to derail Chetty’s application and led to imposition of 
the resulting prepayment penalty.  Appellees’ encouragement of the refinance was 
“harmless” absent these external factors.  
Chetty focuses on the timeline
3
 as evidencing Appellees’ control over when the 
prepayment penalties began to accrue.  This argument fails, however, because the 
timeline makes clear that it merely sets forth “anticipated subsequent milestones” for the 
refinancing, and includes only “approximate” start and end dates for each stage.  App. at 
75 (emphasis added).  It was ultimately Northwestern Mutual that made the decision 
about when it would no longer suspend the prepayment penalties.  Moreover, this 
argument misses the larger point that it was the sale after the deadline—not the deadline 
itself—that caused Chetty to incur the prepayment penalties.  
Finally, the engagement letter informed Chetty of the risks by noting that “FHA 
may issue an FHA Firm Commitment.  If the FHA Firm Commitment is issued . . .”  App. 
                                              
3
 Both the timeline and the engagement letter (discussed infra) are referenced in 
the complaint and are part of the record on appeal.  They may, therefore, be considered at 
the motion to dismiss stage.  See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that a court may consider the 
allegations in the complaint and documents referenced therein when deciding a motion to 
dismiss).  
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at 232 (emphasis added).  The letter further provided that “[t]his Engagement is not and 
shall not be construed as a commitment of or by Lender to make the Loan or any other 
loan to you,” and “[t]he Borrower understands, acknowledges and agrees that: (i) Lender 
has not made any representations or warranties regarding the results of the FHA 
Mortgage Insurance processing . . . .  While Lender will seek to obtain an FHA Firm 
Commitment and provide a Loan at an interest rate satisfactory to you, we cannot 
promise or otherwise assure you that we will be successful.”  App. at 234.  The complaint 
acknowledges that Kuhn gave this notice to Chetty.  Even assuming Appellees 
negligently advised Chetty during the application process, Chetty was very much aware 
that the HUD insurance was not a foregone conclusion.  This bolsters the District Court’s 
conclusion that any negligence merely created a situation that was harmless absent the 
myriad causative factors discussed above.
4
  
 Appellees could not guarantee that Chetty would receive the financing and Chetty 
acknowledged that fact.  The costs incurred were likewise the result of Chetty’s own 
decisions and of matters outside Appellees’ control.  The District Court looked to these 
facts and properly concluded that they satisfied two elements of the Restatement’s 
                                              
4
 Chetty argues that none of the factors considered by the District Court were “the 
type of ‘superseding cause’ necessary to absolve [Appellees] of their liability.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 23-27.  This argument likewise fails because the District Court did not 
rely upon a “superseding cause” analysis; instead, it properly followed the Restatement 
by considering the “other factors which contribute[d] in producing the harm” and 
concluding that Appellees’ negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Chetty’s 
harm.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(a). 
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definition of substantial factor.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (“The following 
considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another important in 
determining whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor . . .” (emphasis added)).  
In light of these facts, no jury could reasonably conclude that Appellees’ alleged 
negligence proximately caused Chetty’s injury. 
IV. 
 For the above stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Chetty’s third amended complaint.   
